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Abstract 
 
Previous research documented the existence of market anomalies; this work directs its focus 
on the possible usage of this evidence into a profitable trading strategy. It connects itself with 
the recent literature around the forecasting power of market anomalies over the cross-section 
of stock returns, in particular Lewellen (2014). Using a sample of twenty-six anomalies their 
pervasiveness is tested over the Eurozone (represented by the companies included in the five 
biggest stock indexes) in the new millennium era. A portfolio that combines the anomalies 
according to their past performance outperformed the main Euro stock indexes, obtaining a 
Sharpe ratio of 0,59 and an annualized alpha of 7,41%. Moreover the attractiveness of the 
portfolio is augmented by its dynamicity: due to the large amount of factors analyzed and the 
flexibility of the Sharpe Ratio as an indicator the portfolio is able to detect cyclicality in the 





There has been evidence of the existence of market anomalies, variables that retain a certain 
forecasting power and allow an estimation of the expected stock returns. This proof does not 
grant certainty around the possible usage of the same variables in a profitable way. The main 
contribution of this thesis will be to extend the study of how an investor can use the findings 
around market anomalies, and then to assess how profitable this will turn out to be. Lewellen 
(2014) has already documented the predictive power of market anomalies in the US; I will 
extend this to the Eurozone. Secondly the contributions will be merely linked to the market 
and sample chosen: the efficiency of the euro market in the early 2000 will be tested coupled 
with an overview of how good the common asset pricing models capture the cross-section of 
returns. 
 
Past models gave an explanation of how the stock price should be formed; according to the 
dividend discount model the value should be equal to the present value of all the cash flows 
that it pays. The capital gains produced by expected future price of the stock are incorporated 
by the present price, but these capital gains are mainly dependent on dividend forecasts at 
every point in time. A useful variation of this model, the constant-growth dividend discount 
model, relieves investors from making estimation of every dividend payments and introduces 
the constant growth of the dividends; this figure is hard to determine and it makes the analysis 
very sensitive.  
 
Another model, the P/E model, asserts that the value of the stock should be decomposed in 
two parts: one it is linked to the present value of the company assets and their ability to 
generate cash flows, a second part is referred to the growth opportunities, represented by the 
present value of the projects that the company has. The price earnings ratio summarizes the 
information contained in these two parts, it reflects the market expectations around the growth 
opportunities of a company. 
 
Even if extremely important, these models, as all models, have some assumptions that in 
practice make their implementation difficult; for example in the dividend discount model 
there is no clear way to estimate what is the growth rate of dividends, whereas for the P/E 
model the approximation of the NPV of future projects is also uncertain.  Finally, both models 
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are using the risk-adjusted rate of return as discount rate, and this figure is always hard to 
appraise, even when using the current asset-pricing models. 
 
In a broad way, it is this required rate of return, which is the objective of this work. This 
return should reflect the risk of the security and according to the efficient market hypothesis 
this risk is correctly priced such that there are no possibilities for investors to generate an 
expected rate of return, in excess to the risk-free rate, that it is not a risk premium. 
 
Colliding to this view several exceptions were reported, i.e. market anomalies; these 
anomalies were the result of observations of the relation between the stock returns and 
different variables related to either the fundamentals of a company or its technical analysis. 
This study was usually conducted using the cross-section of stock returns with the anomaly 
variable significant in order to explain the differences in stock returns. More specifically the 
anomaly variable was discovered to have an explanatory power not recognized by known risk 
premiums, so a trading strategy based on the anomaly was able to produce abnormal returns, 
meaning returns not captured by the asset pricing model in use. 
 
The existence of market anomalies created a whole new debate in the financial world related 
to their explanation: those certain about the efficiency of the market pointing the finger 
against the validity of the asset pricing models used, believing in their inability to capture all 
the risk premiums demanded by investors, and those convinced about the inefficiency of the 
market that see market anomalies as a clear example of it. 
 
By now the progresses made are outstanding and despite the level of uncertainty still 
surrounding the topic both directions produced important results. On the one side several 
asset pricing models were developed with an increasing rationale (not based on empirical 
findings) and capability to explain the components of the stock return. On the other side the 
recent branch of finance named behavioral finance was able to explain several anomalies with 
behavioral responses that every investor is affected.  The resolution of this debate is far from 
being solved and the present work does not want to interfere with it. 
 
Indeed it is the usage of these market anomalies for profitable trading strategies that is the aim 
of this thesis. In fact the pure existence of the anomaly, even if proven by some study, does 
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not assure an investor about its efficacy in a trading strategy. This is because there are several 
biases that affect the validity of the discovery. 
 
As pointed out by Hanna and Ready (2005) the anomaly might be an artifact produced by an 
intensive research over a database, this phenomenon is known as data snooping. Secondly the 
anomaly might be vanished due to its recognition by investors, this fact is also due to the 
increasing investing activity and the higher knowledge available to investors. Finally some 
market anomalies involve the usage of dynamic trading strategies that are extremely costly, 
then the overall gain produced by the strategy is basically nothing, entirely captured by the 
transaction costs that it requires. 
 
Another relevant point is the fact that the anomalies may focus on companies in financial 
distress, as identified by Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2010) one set of anomalies 
is related to companies having high credit risk and deteriorating credit conditions, and another 
group of anomalies to companies having high credit risk but in a phase of recovery from 
recent financial distress. 
 
Moreover the attention was more on how these anomalies are correlated with future returns, 
not on how the estimation of these returns according to the same variables are actually equal 
to the realized returns. The thorny point here deals with the ex-ante applicability of the trading 
strategy, a variable can be significant and have explanatory power but at the inception of the 
strategy this may not be known and predicted. In that case the practical implementation of the 
anomalies become relevant for an easy and tradable strategy. This work focuses on this and in 
particular on how to aggregate the anomaly variables into a portfolio. 
 
Most of the academic literature is concentrated over the US market, to distinguish this work 
from the previous ones I decided to focus it on the Euro market; this will help to test the 
persistence of the anomalies in a market different from the one in which they were 
discovered.  The dataset comprises companies in the five major stock indexes in the Euro area 
(France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain) and starts from the beginning of 2004 and it 
ends in the middle of 2014. 
 
The usage of such database is important for two reasons: first it studies the persistency of 
market anomalies on companies that have a great market cap (and thus economically relevant) 
	   9 
then it makes the trading strategies liquid and tradable, avoiding the double bias of focusing 
on micro-cap stocks and companies in financial distress. 
 
There are twenty-six variables analyzed and these include values and growth factors, size, 
momentum, and volatility. At first, for every variable an independent trading strategy is 
developed, with the application of each variable linked to previous findings around its relation 
to the average stock return. Every trading strategy is built on a market-neutral base and uses 
all the securities available (conditional on the availability of data for every factor); one of the 
goals was to limit as much the discretion around possible variants for every strategy, so the 
methodology around the construction of the trading strategy was clear and simple from the 
beginning. 
 
The primary results will be linked to the aggregation and upcoming analysis of the variables 
into a portfolio. The aggregation discriminant will be the performance obtained by the 
strategies based on singular factors.  The portfolio is tested out-of-sample since part of the 
dataset is used to have the performance and then, given this information, the strategies are set 
in place. In this step further variants, concerning different ways to sort stocks, will be used as 




A comprehensive literature review of the topic has to start from its inception and so this 
revision starts from the CAPM initially introduced by Sharpe (1964), the CAPM was the first 
asset pricing model, a model that explains why the return of a security is different from 
another one. According to this model there is only one risk: the market risk. One of the main 
assumptions of the CAPM is that every investor holds a fraction of the market portfolio 
(which is the universe of all risky assets), benefitting from the diversification the contribution 
of a security to the overall riskiness of the portfolio is reduced to the interaction of the 
security with the portfolio. This interaction is represented by the market risk, the beta, which 




The CAPM represented the first attempt to give investors a general understanding of the 
differences in returns and risks of securities. It remained an unproven theory though since the 
introduction of the computers, which made possible to test the theory in practice and to see 
the actual degree of truth in explaining the differences across stock returns. The CAPM gave 
an explanation of the difference between stock returns, but it did not provide any clarification 
about the stock price development in the future and the extent to which this development can 
be forecasted. 
 
An initial effort to give an answer to this problem was made by Louis Bachelier (1900) who 
observed the unpredictability of the stock price and affirmed its “random walk” behavior. 
Bachelier’s thesis did not receive much popularity at the time that was firstly published, 
nevertheless several economists recognized later its importance as a pioneering work in the 
field of financial mathematics. Kendall (1953) was one of the first economists to analyze the 
time series of prices in order to discover some kind of predictability and pattern in the series; 
confirming Bachelier’s intuitions he found that stock prices move in an unpredictable fashion, 
disregarding past performance. 
 
This discovery was at first intended as a sign of market irrationality, then Fama in his PhD 
thesis used these findings to affirm the complete rationality and efficiency dominating the 
market. According to the efficient market hypothesis the information capable of affecting the 
stock price is already incorporated in it and so future price movements are basically random 
and unpredictable. The theory also suggests that once new and relevant information is 
disclosed the price will immediately adjust to a new level. Formally three sets of efficiency 
are highlighted by Fama: a weak form, in which just past information regarding the price is 
incorporated in the price, a semi-strong form, in which all the publicly information is 
included, and a strong form, in which also privately held information is included in the price; 
the semi-strong form includes also the weak form and similarly the strong form includes both, 
the semi-strong and the weak forms. These three versions of market efficiency can be tested, 
with most of the tests targeted to prove or reject the weak and semi-strong form, using 
technical (for the weak) and fundamental indicators (for the semi-strong). From another 
perspective EMH affirms the impossibility to generate any higher return that is not a result of 
the higher risk sustained, the impossibility to use the past information makes any abnormal 
return impossible; as a consequence this theory was not widely accepted on Wall Street. 
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These two theories together set the milestones for further research in the financial markets, 
this was mainly related to empirical studies aimed at the confirmation or rejection of the 
theories. With the computer era a massive quantity of data was analyzed and the financial 
markets were studied in a more quantitative way. A lot of trading strategies were performed 
using different variables, spanning all available information, and soon some of them produced 
abnormal returns, i.e. returns not explained by the CAPM; these variables were identified as 
market anomalies. 
 
All of the empirical tests assume the form of joint tests of both theories, the EMH and the 
CAPM. If the joint test is accepted, implying no abnormal returns are present after the CAPM 
adjustment for risk, then both theories are proven, the asset pricing model and the efficiency 
of the market.  If the test is rejected, it can be either because the market is inefficient or 
because the asset pricing model is not considering some feature that is relevant in the cross-
section of stock returns. 
 
Disregarding now the debate around the nature and explanation of these anomalies, it is 
provided a quick overview of the most well-known market anomalies, out of which some are 
included in the present research. As Fama and French (2008) underlined, two are the most 
used approaches to detect market anomalies in the cross-section of stock returns. The simplest 
one is to sort stock returns on the factor analyzed to see how the average return is distributed 
around the anomaly variable. The main advantage of this method is its simplicity and its 
ability to provide a quick overview of the impact of the factor on the stock return. A more 
technical approach involves the use of the Fama-MacBeth regression, divided in two steps, 
the first one involves time series regressions for all the assets in the portfolio, the stock return 
of each asset is regressed over the anomaly variable; in the second step all the coefficients 
estimated in the first one are used as independent variable in cross-sectional regressions using 
again the stock return as explained variable. This method provides a more quantitative 
description on how the factor analyzed is impacting the stock return and how it is priced in 
the cross-section of stock returns. 
 
One of the first market anomaly discovered was the size effect, Banz (1981) showed that 
smaller firms tend to outperform bigger ones. Basu (1977) focused on the P/E ratio and 
observed that stocks with low P/E have higher returns than firms with high P/E. Stattman 
(1980) used the book value of equity to its market value, and documented the positive relation 
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between this variable and the stock return. Bhandari (1988) reported the positive effect of 
leverage on the average stock return. Loughran and Ritter (1995) showed the negative 
performance of companies that experienced an IPO or seasoned equity offer in the five years 
after the operation. Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) noticed how companies that invest more tend 
to have negative abnormal returns, this finding is even augmented for those companies with 
higher cash flows and more solid capital structure. On a similar level Cooper, Gulen and 
Schill (2009) documented how firms with low asset growth (measured as the yearly change in 
the total assets) tend to outperform firms with high asset growth. Sloan (1996) identified the 
negative impact of accruals on the stock price. Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) confirm findings 
around the positive link between long-term stock return and share repurchase announcements, 
stock mergers and seasoned equity offers, exploring the relation of stock issuance and the 
cross-section of stock returns, affirming how stock issuance is statistically more relevant in 
predicting returns than other well-known anomalies. 
 
A special mention is appropriate for those anomalies that are based on the historical stock 
prices; this because out of the market anomalies those are the ones that contradict even with 
the weak form of the EMH. One of the first paper using technical indicators is the one from 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985), using the past three and five years stock performance they 
observed the stock reversal effect, meaning that the companies that performed worst were the 
ones that outperformed the others in the subsequent period, simultaneously the best ones 
underperformed the others. A similar conclusion was found by Jegadeesh (1990), who 
showed the negative auto-correlation of returns in the 1-month window but also the positive 
auto-correlation for longer lags up to one year. Moving from this last finding, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) used the stock returns over the past three to twelve months (skipping the most 
recent week to avoid the negative correlation in the stock returns) and observed how the past 
winners outperformed the past losers also in the future, this particular anomaly gained much 
recognition and it was named momentum. 
 
An interesting implication of the EMH is that whenever new information is released the stock 
price should immediately adjust reflecting the content of the information. This gave rise to a 
whole new type of study in finance, the event study, an analysis directed to understand the 
development of the stock price on certain event like an earnings announcement. Despite their 
relevance, Ball and Brown (1968) found that there are no price adjustments after an earnings 
announcement. Rendleman, Jones and Latané (1982) studied the phenomenon in a different 
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way, instead of looking at the earnings announcement they observed the earnings surprise 
(measured as the difference between the estimated/expected earnings and the announced one) 
and observed not only a price adjustment but also a momentum pattern whenever the surprise 
was positive or negative. 
 
The interpretation of these market anomalies is always arduous, sometimes because it is 
puzzling to find a rational explanation for the anomaly, in other words it appears to be 
difficult to explain the superior returns as a compensation for the higher risk sustained. Even 
if the previous statement is correct for factors like P/E or size is really hard to think that the 
problem is related to the overall efficiency of the market; such that strategies based on such 
factor are too simple to be able to produce abnormal returns, investors in the world should do 
this on regular basis and then the abnormal return should disappear. 
 
Fama and French (1996) argued that for some anomalies the factor used to obtain the 
abnormal returns may act as a proxy for a different source of risk; for example when looking 
at firms with high book to market ratio they observed how these companies are usually more 
unstable and more likely to be in financial distress, a similar consideration is done for small 
firms, which are more prone to suffer variations in the business cycle. 
 
Different asset pricing models were developed in order to explain and capture the cross-
section of the returns in a more comprehensive way than what the CAPM did. Some others 
indeed argued that the presence of market anomalies is a distinct sign of the market 
inefficiency, and within this line of thought some think that this is because the market is 
dominated by irrational investors and that modern finance ignores some behavioral effects 
that are able to explain most of this irrationality. 
 
The first asset pricing model that tries to solve this issues is the one developed by Fama and 
French (1992), in this model along with the market beta also a size and value factor, 
represented by B/M, are added. The reasons for having this three factors is mostly empirical, 
given the previous findings Fama and French decided to expand the CAPM with two of the 
most constant market anomalies. The result is surprisingly good with the model that seems to 
capture the cross-section of returns for the US market from 1963 to 1990. The surprising part 
was though related to the poor significance of the market beta, with the size and value 
coefficient that were basically the only explanatory variables for the returns. 
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With the three-factor model most of the anomalies vanished, but one of the most important, 
momentum, still persisted. In order to include this variable Carhart (1997) added a momentum 
factor, similar to the three-factor model also the four-factor model is an empirical model, it 
takes as given some findings that are relevant in the cross-section of returns and it includes 
those in the model. 
 
Recently Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang (2010) developed an alternative three-factor model, 
this model is constituted by three explanatory variables: the market beta, an investment factor 
and a profitability factor (with ROA used as proxy). The introduction of these two factors is 
motivated by an investment reason. To infer the cost of capital (i.e. the required return 
demanded by investors) the level of investments is meaningful: assuming a fixed level of 
expected cash flows, the cost of capital determines the NPV of a project, if high the level of 
investment will also be high because of the profitable project to finance; the opposite is also 
true. So from the level of investment one can infer the cost of capital of the company; this 
measure is coupled with ROA. Observing a high ROA and a low level of investment means 
that the high ROA is offset by a high cost of capital; ROA in this sense acts like another 
determinant for the specification of the cost of capital. 
 
Of all the anomalies, momentum (together with other technical factors) is one of the most 
deceptive and hard to explain, an attempt to solve the problem was made by Chen (1991) who 
gave the interpretation of momentum as a pattern emerging because risk premiums are time 
varying. The level of risk and risk aversion are both changing during business cycles, e.g. 
during a recession expected returns can be higher because of an increase in risk and risk 
aversion (since wealth is decreasing and we face diminishing marginal utility function). To 
the extent that these cycles happen with a certain frequency this can lead to the technical 
pattern in the stock returns, as momentum. 
 
On a similar level, Campbell et al. (2008) declare that the size and value factors on the three-
factor-model are acting as an imprecise proxy for the risk of the firm being in financial 
distress, this because companies having high loadings on these two factors are exhibiting high 
risk but not high returns. Confirming the result of this paper Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and 
Philipov (2010) explore commonalities across the anomalies and noted how most of them are 
highly related to companies being in financial distress or recovering by it. Hence they 
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conclude that most of market anomalies are generating abnormal returns because of the 
inability of asset pricing models to capture the risk of financial distress. 
 
Liew and Vassalou (2000) used portfolios based on size and B/M and found how the returns 
produced by these portfolios can be linked to macroeconomic risk. The main result of the 
paper is that these two factors have explanatory power when regressed over future GDP 
growth, even when controlling for other known predictors of business cycles. This result 
suggests that small and high B/M companies are more prone to be in financial distress when 
an economic downturn is approaching. The intuition is stronger because of the high 
persistency for companies to have either small market cap or high B/M, suggesting that 
investors are aware of this risk and then demand a premium for holding such stocks. 
 
In their latest paper Fama and French (2013) developed a five-factor model, with the goal to 
expand the explanatory power of the three-factor model and to base this more on a rational 
base rather than an empirical one. They noticed how size, B/M, expected earnings and 
investment are all variables that are implied and included in the dividend discount model; an 
important model aimed to identify the intrinsic value of a stock, in the model is asserted that 
this value is the present value of the future dividends that the stock will pay. One of the 
practical issues was to find a valid proxy for profitability and investments, they then used 
operating profitability minus interest expense for profitability and the asset growth for 
investment. The model failed the GRS test, that measures if the levels of the intercept from a 
multiple regression model are jointly zero, nevertheless it provides a good explanation of the 
cross-section of returns. Interestingly, the B/M factor is not relevant in order to capture 
abnormal returns, because its significance is seized by the other four factors, but still it 
provides a good explanation of portfolio’s exposure towards the size, value, profitability and 
investment. 
 
Despite the growing explanatory power of such asset pricing models some academics are 
convinced about the irrationality and inefficiency of the market. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) in their prospect theory used tools from psychology to explain the behavior of 
investors, in particular they stated how an investor does not act rationally and does not make 
optimal decisions, instead it is biased from a series of behavioral phenomena. In their paper 
they enumerate three common patterns in investors’ behavior: the framing effect, stating that 
the context in which the individual makes a choice is relevant for the outcome of this 
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decision; the loss aversion, affirming the fact that a loss is always worse than sacrifice a gain; 
the isolation effect, when facing consecutive probabilities individuals tend to isolate the odd 
of each event without considering the overall probability. 
 
This whole branch of study got the name of behavioral finance and it is based on two pillars:  
first economic agents are believed to act irrationally and secondly rational arbitrageurs cannot 
exploit the mispricing because of limited resources. In addition to this the arbitrage 
opportunities are not of the pure arbitrage nature, i.e. they are not risk free, mentioning a 
common sentence attributed to Keynes: “markets can stay irrational longer than you staying 
solvent”. 
 
One of the most important papers in this area, by De Bondt and Thaler (1994) explained the 
anomalies related to some value factors (P/E for example) as under or overreactions of 
investors, in particular when new information is released the market participants tend to 
exaggerate the feelings toward a company. This explanation rapidly gained consensus and 
different papers after this tried to expand the initial definition, for example La Porta (1996) 
argued that analysts are always too optimistic or too pessimistic when giving expectations 
about firms’ growth rates and this gives rise to mispricing in the market. 
 
According to Grinblatt and Han (2002) one anomaly, stock reversal in the short term, can be 
explained with the disposition effect, according to this investors are less likely to recognize 
losses than gain, so the consequence is that they will keep stocks that are underperforming 
and they will sell those that increased in value to lock the gains. 
 
The critics of behavioral finance argue that it is easy to explain a market anomaly with a 
behavioral response when it is done after having observed the anomaly but impossible to use 
the same argumentations to detect it. 
 
The present work focuses on the usages of the previous findings related to market anomalies, 
its primary aim is to see if these anomalies can lead to substantial profits and how can they be 
interpolated with each other to maximize the return. This goal will be coupled with the intent 
of finding what could have been possible and rational ex-ante, by this it is meant that the 
trading strategies are performed out of sample, with a precise method (i.e. limiting as much as 
possible discretionary choices) to use the information available. 
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There are several papers that share a similar aim, at first, Fama and French (2008) published a 
paper in which they revisited all the principal market anomalies with the purpose to 
understand which ones are the most persistent and how are they structured in different size 
groups. They use both portfolio sorting and cross-section regression to have a clear picture of 
which factor is relevant in order to explain the stock returns. The size division has to be 
intended for a reason of economic significance: even if they account for 3% of the total 
capitalization microcaps stocks are 60% of the number of stocks in the NYSE-Amex-
NASDAQ universe and according to Fama and French 60% of the stocks in the extreme 
portfolio sorting are from microcap stocks. Having divided stocks into three size groups 
(micro, small and big) they found that returns associated with net stock issues, accruals and 
momentum are the only widespread in each group.  
 
Haugen and Baker (1996) started their analysis with the consideration that non-risk related 
factors are relevant explaining the stock returns, assuming that also stocks are different in 
their liquidity they divided factors in five classes: risk, liquidity, price-level, growth potential 
and price history. They used cross-sectional regressions to estimate the expected return for the 
following month using all the factors available (a total of fifty variables), the payoffs are 
aggregated with a simple average of the past twelve months reaching the expected return for 
the factor analyzed. The first twelve months prior 1979 are used to make a first estimation of 
the payoffs, the future coefficients for each payoff are then given by a 12-month trailing 
mean, the whole process is repeated till the end of 1993. Together with a test with all factors 
other two are run to see if the results are highly dependent to the effect of some previously 
mentioned anomaly: first all factor besides momentum related ones are dropped, then all 
except the ones related to the cheapness in price (for instance B/M and P/E). The spread 
between the realized returns from the highest to the lowest decile is 35% and this spread is 
drastically decreasing when the factors are simply momentum or cheapness in price ones, the 
authors’ deduction is that the predictive power is laying mostly on the multitude of factors 
used. The main results of the paper are linked to the average fundamentals of companies that 
are in the highest decile from the ones in the lowest one; Haugen and Baker looking at these 
features are trying to infer if the superior performance of decile ten is a reward for the highest 
risk taken. The assessment is made in two ways, at first looking at the average fundamentals 
across deciles, like D/E or volatility, the second using the Fama, French three-factor model. 
The conclusion is that it is quite difficult to argue that firms in decile ten are riskier than the 
ones in the lowest decile, looking at the fundamentals these companies show a more stable 
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condition and lower volatility, regarding the model they have lower loadings on all three 
factors. 
 
Hanna and Ready (2005) reexamined some of the previous findings related to market 
anomalies and questioned whether a dynamic trading strategy combining these anomalies 
would lead to substantial profits, even adjusting for transaction costs. The anomalies (B/M, 
six months past returns, Haugen and Baker’s factors) are organized in different independent 
portfolios, using the same dataset (the Russell 3000 Index) but on a more extended period to 
the papers related to the anomalies (from 1979 to 2001) so the strategies are partially tested 
out-of-sample. Stocks are assigned decile rankings for each factor; for B/M and momentum 
the sort is done directly from the factor, whereas for the Haugen and Baker’s variables the 
sort is done by the expected returns. The portfolios are formed using companies in decile one 
and ten; both equally-weighted and value-weighted, with monthly rebalancing (important to 
account for the transaction costs). For every strategy there is a difference in return from decile 
ten to decile one, with the Haugen and Baker’s difference more than double than the other 
two portfolios (+31,2% and -6% the annualized return); this result is statistically significant 
different from zero at the .01 confidence level using the t-test. The excess return of each 
strategy is then tested using the CAPM, in order to see which weight to give for every 
strategy, the alpha is divided by the residual variance. Also accounting for trade delays and 
transaction costs the portfolio formed on B/M is the one showing the best alpha/residual 
variance ratio The last part of the paper concerns the portfolio optimization, to maximize the 
Sharpe ratio. This maximization is unfeasible in practice because it takes the ex-post 
distribution of the returns as given, having this in mind the optimal portfolio when only long 
positions are allowed is made 80% by B/M portfolio and 20% of the momentum portfolio. 
When short selling is permitted the HB portfolio is in the optimal one just for the short part, 
even excluding it the overall result doesn’t change much (Sharpe ratio of 0,38 versus 0,378). 
 
Lewellen (2014) focused on the Fama-MacBeth regression to forecast returns; using a set of 
fifteen firm characteristics for the US stock market from 1964 to 2009, Lewellen, in his 
primary test, used the slopes derived from a rolling ten years FM regression in order to predict 
monthly returns. These fifteen factors are organized in three different portfolios, with the 
most persistent factors composing the first model (like B/M or size) and the less persistent 
factors added to this first set in the second and third portfolio; the reason is to move from a 
portfolio of well-known predictors of stock returns from others that include other variables 
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that an investor could have thought of. Stocks are then sorted on the expected return forecast. 
The main result concerns the overall realized return versus the forecasted one, for the first 
portfolio the estimated spread between the top and worst decile is 2,82% whereas the realized 
one is almost as large, 2,43%. The interesting result is that the forecasting power of the most 
important factors account for most of the success of the FM regression, in fact the last 
portfolio, including factors like dividend yield and sales to price ratio, does not add anything 
to the overall forecasting power of the model. 
 
Following this last stream of literature I will move from analyzing the predictive power of 
market anomalies to the employment of the same variables in different trading strategies, 
trying to detect how much an investor could gain from this evidence. My effort will be 
concentrated on how these factors can be aggregated into a profitable and ex-ante feasible 
strategy. Differing from these papers I will not use cross-sectional regressions to determine 
the expected returns but a more practical approach, directly developing a trading strategy 
based on those variables. The analysis starts with the factors taken individually rather than 
having all of them in a portfolio; as a consequence the following step is their aggregation, 
rather than separation, into a portfolio. The discriminant for the aggregation will be the actual 
performance of every factor and not a division “per classes” as in Lewellen (2014) or Haugen 
and Baker (1996). 
 
One of the main criticism related to market anomalies is the usage of the same database (US 
market generally) to discover and test the magnitude of the anomalies, the phenomenon is 
known as data snooping. Expressing this concept in the words of Ronald Coase: “if you 
torture the data long enough, it will confess”. Some work has been done to avoid this bias and 
even if not widespread to all findings around market anomalies at least the most important 
ones were also tested using financial markets different from the US one. 
 
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) extended the evidence over momentum and value in 
the British, European and Japanese markets; finding abnormal returns that are consistent with 
what documented for the US market. Using also different and uncorrelated asset classes a 
similar patter is discovered, since the strategies based on momentum and value have a strong 
correlation structure this induces the authors to conclude that momentum and value might be 
a premium for global risk factors. 
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Fama and French (2012) find a considerable persistency of size, value and momentum effects 
in international stock markets (North American, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific). Using 
different versions of the three-factor model and the four-factor model Fama and French tried 
to explain the returns produced by trading strategies on size, value and momentum for each of 
the region; when the explanatory variables (meaning the returns produced by the factors of the 
asset pricing model) are taken globally the results are quite poor, contrasting partially with 
Asness et al. (2013) and the possibility that size, value and momentum could be linked to 
global risk factors. 
 
The contributions that I am expecting will be twofold, even though very linked to each other. 
On one side the different data set from the original one, in which the market anomaly was 
discovered, acts as a double check for the persistence of the anomaly. In addition the different 
period analyzed adds ulterior material for this proof. On the other side studying the 
implementation in practice of market anomalies will function as a verification of them on a 
different level: even if present the anomaly could not be used because at the beginning of the 
period the investors do not have any tool to infer how much predictive power each variable 
has. Both contributions are acting in the more comprehensive environment of the efficient 
market hypothesis, as all these studies the main conclusion will always be related to the 





The analysis is directed towards the Euro market; instead of picking a broad index as the 
EURO STOXX I preferred to create a sample of companies from the five most important 
Euro stock market indexes; namely the Dutch (AEX 25), French (CAC 40), German (DAX 
30), Italian (FTSE MIB 35) and Spanish (IBEX 35). The complete list of companies used is 
presented in the appendix. 
 
Following Fama, French (2008) I use only the bigger stocks. In fact this is what institutions 
actually invest in, among other things, because of liquidity concerns. As a proof of this, 
around all the minimum points touched by the market caps of all companies in the whole 
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sample the median point is 3.351 billion €, just as a comparison Fama and French in the same 
paper identified 610 million $ the breakpoint on the NYSE to be a micro-cap stock. 
 
The set of factors analyzed are related to previous findings surrounding their applicability to 
predict stock returns in the cross-section; trying to gather an acceptable number of companies 
reporting, the list of these factors can be found in the appendix. Broadly speaking the factors 
covered are mostly related to the fundamental variables of a company, highlighting different 
aspects from the risk, profitability or fair valuation of the stock price, but also technical 
indicators based on previous stock returns. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the factors and the descriptive statistic for the whole sample 
and the two sub samples. The period analyzed is from 2004 to mid 2014. The data is initially 
daily organized and from this the technical factors are built. All the data, from the price series 
to the accounting variables is downloaded from Bloomberg. Price series is retrieved using the 
PX_LAST ticker, which gives back the closing price of a specific day. Accounting variables 
are, on the other hand, linked to company reports. 
 
More precisely the technical factors used can be divided into three categories: momentum, 
volatility and market beta. Momentum consists of the cumulative return of the past 20-260 
and 130-260 trading days; using the same windows but the average return instead of the 
cumulative one other two factors are created. Similarly, volatility comprises two factors 
constructed using the standard deviation of the past 20-260 and 130-260 daily stock returns.  
Finally the market beta refers to one factor that is the slope of past 260 daily stock returns of a 
security and the return of the stock index in which the company is quoted on. 
 
In order to avoid the problem of analyzing a period taking the ex-post winners (i.e. 
survivorship bias) the index composition is taken at the inception of the strategy. The list of 
companies forming the indexes is assembled again in 2009, this is necessary because some 
companies got delisted through time and to successfully perform the strategies I need a 
substantial number of companies that are alive and disclosing information. Some companies 
are quoted in more than one market, to not have the same security twice the stock listed in the 




A clarification: most of the companies are always reporting, but for some factors the 
availability is not so widespread and this is an issue with the factor itself and not with the fact 
that the company is not reporting at all. When a company is delisted in the trading strategy 
this acts in the same way as a real event and not like an ex-post manipulation; the company is 
available for investment purpose until the moment that it gets delisted. 
 
Table1: descriptive statistics 2004-2014. 
All the data is gathered from Bloomberg, for each factor is reported the average value (Avg), the standard 






Given a set of proven predictors in the cross-section of stock returns, the problem is to find a 
profitable way to use them. Instead of using cross-sectional regressions to see to what extent 
each factor predicts the stock return and then make usage of this information I directly used 
all factors individually into trading strategies and then valued their quality based on the 
performance obtained. 
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Since daily trading would be too costly transaction wise, I extracted the data at the end of 
every month from the database and built all the trading strategies that are rebalanced monthly. 
More specifically the signal to buy or sell is given at the end of a month and then applied for 
the following one. This method partially differentiate this work to ones that share the same 
aim, mostly Lewellen (2014) and Haugen and Baker (1996), because it takes factors 
individually and then mixes them rather than initially start with a considerable amount of 
factors and then excluding some. This approach is different because it ignores the correlation 
between factors relying solely on the goodness of their past performance. 
 
To not develop the strategies on information that is not yet available a lag is introduced, there 
is a distinction between variables though; the information regarding fundamental variables is 
lagged by three months due to the delay of companies to release the annual and infra annual 
reports. Whereas no lag is applied concerning market information since these are assumed to 
be easily accessible by everyone and basically at every moment.  
 
The allocation of resources is achieved through portfolio sorting, using ranks. Specifically 
every security receives a rank established on the factor examined, the long position is selected 
using previous findings around the factors, e.g. for ROA the company displaying the highest 
ROA will also have the highest rank. For some factors the link is immediate since the factor is 
the same variable analyzed in some previous paper, for others there is no such link, I then 
tried to apply the intuition of the paper to the new factor. 
 
Instead of looking at the different percentiles and select a top/worst class in which to invest 
in, I preferred to use the whole sample, assigning a weight based on the rank for all. At first 
this eliminates the discretion among the percentile to pick when an investment decision is 
made, i.e. there is no model that states before which percentile is better to use, so this choice 
is left to the preference of the investor. Then it will help to see the persistency of the anomaly 
variable not only in the extremes of the portfolio sorting, but using all the securities available. 
Roughly, at every point in time, half of the companies will compose the long position and the 
other half the short position. 
 
The strategy is built on a euro-neutral base and standardized such that the long position sums 
up to 1 and the short position to -1. The weight given to each security is applied following the 
approach of Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013): 
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𝑤!"! = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆!" −   
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Where N represents the number of companies, i the company, t the time and S the factor used, 
c is a scaling factor: 
𝑓𝑜𝑟  𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠:  𝑐! =    𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆!" −   




At the end of this procedure I have a trading strategy for every variable in the dataset; the 
overview of the risk-return profile for all the individual strategies is presented in table 2. As a 
matter of completeness in the table are also presented all the five stock indexes plus an equal-
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Table 2: summary statistics for trading strategies on singular factor, from May 2004 to May 2014. 
In the first set of factors the long position is assigned to those securities having the highest values, in the second 
set the opposite is done. The index returns in the last panel are total returns, in excess to the risk-free rate. 





Last remark: in table 2, I highlighted the Sharpe ratio which in this case is not considering the 
excess risk premium but just divides the mean with the standard deviation, this is because the 




Support the evidence: abnormal returns for the twenty-six factors 
 
Before going through the analysis of the factors and their employment into a composite 
trading strategy it is worth to first test the results of the simple trading strategies on singular 
factors. This will provide the preliminary results around the persistency of these anomalies 
over the new period and, more importantly, a new market. 
 
Table 3: alphas for trading strategies on singular factors, returns from May 2004 to May 2014. 




The models used to observe the alphas are the ones mostly used in the papers where the 
anomaly was discovered. Even if a more complete model could be used this choice is 
prevalently linked to the interest of observing the anomaly in a different context with the 
same instruments. In table 3 it is provided evidence of the abnormal returns produced by the 
strategies, the coefficients are not highlighted since when further processing the variables into 
a portfolio they are not considered. 
 
Despite the usage of the same variables as in related papers, a major difference could be the 
different methodology used to build the trading strategies, once again, not investing just in the 
top-worst decile but in all the securities with a weight proportional to the rank. 
 
Table 3 depicts a controversial scenario: out of twenty-six factors thirteen obtained a positive 
alpha according to both asset pricing models, and from this group eight are statistically 
significant; even if the group represents the majority of the variables it is still not high enough 
to conclude that the market anomalies are mostly pervasive in the Eurozone. It should also be 
noticed that in the same group several factors are very similar to each other (for example the 
variants of momentum or volatility). 
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It is also true to affirm that not even the most well-known ones are present in Europe; starting 
with P/B the alpha is not just negative but also highly significant even when correcting for the 
Fama French three-factor-model. A similar situation is displayed by asset growth, a variable 
that is used as a proxy of investments in the new five-factor-model of Fama and French 
(2013). D/E also represents an important contradiction to the evidence, firm that showed a 
lower leverage actually gained a premium that is hardly explainable as risk premium as it is 
indeed the high leverage since it can be easily linked to the likelihood of a firm to be in 
financial distress or more vulnerable if a recession is approaching. 
 
From the group of variables that exhibited a negative alpha MK is one of the most evident 
example. Big stocks outperformed small stocks, and generated a positive abnormal return, 
statistically significant at the 10% level for CAPM and 1% for the three-factor-model. Indeed 
it should be mentioned that most of the American literature considers bigger indexes, like the 
Russell 3000, and so the spanning market cap is more accentuated that the one I have in my 
sample; so this difference can partially explain the different result. 
 
It is most likely, though, that the difference is rooted in the sample, and this consideration is 
valid for all the anomalies; some anomalies may not be pervasive because of the distressed 
period analyzed, so the bad performance can be partially tied to this and the fact that these 
strategies are cyclical rather than that they are not applicable to the Eurozone market. Going 
back again on size and value, because of their popularity among the anomalies, it should be 
noticed that the poor result that they obtained during this period is also clearly shown in the 
returns of the SML and HML factors of the three-factor model for Europe. 
 
Moreover, anomalies are usually discovered using an extended period, since this study uses a 
10-year period the pervasiveness of the anomalies can be rejected for sure for the period 
considered but since this is not tremendously high their presence in the Eurozone cannot be 
fully assessed. 
 
Afterwards, when correcting for common risk factors, I will use a more complete asset pricing 
model, the four-factor-model. Consequently, the alphas of the individual strategies will be 




Factors aggregation: Sharpe ratio’s screening 
 
The considerations around the results obtained by each individual strategy will come together 
with the ones obtained by the portfolio made by combination of factors. 
 
The idea of aggregating the factors is linked to the belief that the performance will improve 
because of the higher degree of information used and taken advantage of; in other words it 
introduces the benefits of diversification. The problematic point copes with the aggregation of 
the factors, meaning to have a rationale for having a particular set of factors together. 
 
Since one of the goal is to leave as much of the heterogeneity around investors’ beliefs and 
preferences out, instead of aggregating factors using an artificial division by classes I used 
their past performances. The tool used to build the different portfolios is the Sharpe ratio 
produced by the strategies based on singular factors. This indicator is chosen because it 
summarizes the information regarding the risk-return profile of a particular strategy and 
mostly, it makes every strategy comparable and easily classified. A higher Sharpe ratio, even 
if produced by a strategy that has a low average return, is always preferable to a lower one 
with a high average return because of the possibility to leverage the first strategy and magnify 
the returns. 
 
In order to have a stable outlook of the Sharpe ratios, the first twenty-four months of the 
sample are used to observe the development of this figure and used to invest from month 
twenty-five (April 2006) onwards. When I am calculation the Sharpe ratio I always use all the 
history available, such that the sample used for this computation is enlarged every month by 
one unit. 
 
Technically the trading strategy is performed using the same rules as before, the difference is 
now that the rank is not a direct product of the factor but is a combined rank, having each 
factor weighted differently according to their Sharpe ratio. For every security i, the formula to 
obtain the ranks later used to sort the securities is the following: 




Where w represent the weight placed to the factor s. 
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To not have in the portfolio two identical factors I discarded the EPS annualized factor and 
the two momentum factors with moving averages. This because in the first twenty-four 
months they performed slightly worse than their counterparts, respectively the trail 12-months 
EPS and momentum factors built using cumulative returns. 
 
In view of the fact that the factors suffer from different number of observations I adopted the 
same approach as in Haugen and Baker (1996). I modified the database so to have all factors 
with the same amount of observations: when the company is alive but a certain factor is 
missing the mean sample value is assigned to that company. The aim is not to throw away 
valid data reducing the sample to companies having all factors. Nonetheless this step may bias 
the accuracy of the results, this is certainly true for those factors that exhibit a serious lack of 
data but in general this is not the case, having most of the factors with quite equal 
observations (close to the totality of companies). 
 
Since investors care more about the performance and less about what past academic evidence 
have proved I took a similar point of view, treating all the variables in an equal way, using the 
Sharpe ratio that they produced as the only discriminant. This consideration then induces to 
include the factors that underperformed and question if the long position was chosen wrongly, 
i.e. the factor was showing an opposite relation to returns than the one initially thought. 
 
Using the past performance as only driver to aggregate the factors has a main downside: it 
ignores the correlation between the factors. In fact it might happen that most of the portfolio’s 
returns are resting on variables that are positively correlated with each other. The risk is that 
the portfolio could be more vulnerable to sudden changes in the profitability of the same 
variables; in other words it looses in terms of diversification.  
 
A simple way to aggregate the factors moves from the consideration that the ones having the 
highest Sharpe would be the factors most attractive to use; then using a formula to give a 
weight to the factor that is proportional to its Sharpe ratio should reflect this consideration.  
A possible procedure to do it would be to simply divide the individual Sharpe by the sum of 
all the Sharpe ratios of the strategies: 




Where w represents the weight placed to the factor and S the Sharpe ratio that it produced. 
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In this view factors are observed for their absolute Sharpe ratio value: if the sign is positive it 
means that the relation is the one initially assumed and if it is negative it means that the 
ranking may be given incorrectly and should be changed into the new order (e.g. instead of 
sorting stocks using a descending order sort them in an ascending one). Expanding this idea, 
if the Sharpe ratio is negative an investor could have thought about the misuse of a factor and 
that if he had invested following an inverted order he would have got a positive ratio. In this 
case this presumption is certainly true because the specific formula that gives weight to 
securities assures that if the highest rank would be given to the lowest value instead of the 
highest the return would be the same as before but with a different sign. Therefore the Sharpe 
would be the same in absolute terms but with a plus instead of a minus in front. 
 
At first glimpse changing the belief towards a factor just because the Sharpe ratio is negative 
may be too drastic, but it should not be forgotten that the metric is built from, at least, the past 
twenty-four months performance and so it should capture something more than a pure 
deviation from the relation expected. Even if the previous statement is true this will not 
compromise the results of the portfolio: if the Sharpe ratio changes from positive to negative 
in a specific month it is fair to assume that it was close to zero until the month before. 
Therefore the factor will receive, in both, previous and current portfolio rebalancing a weight 
that is very low. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of this portfolio, it is useful to have a first idea around its 
performance. The risk-return profile obtained was above the five indexes that act as a 
benchmark; the average return was above the one offered by the indexes and the volatility 
was slightly lower. The cumulative return of the strategy denotes a clear upward trend, with 
most of the returns that are coming from the after crisis period. 
 
Table 4: summary statistics for portfolio created using all the 23 variables. The starting point is May 2006 and it 
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I will now focus on the interpretation and further analysis of the results earned by the simple 
strategies and for the portfolio on all factors. Given the fact that the effect of the financial 
crisis of 2008 in this sample is really relevant and due to the shortness of the period analyzed, 
I will provide a separate picture for its effects on the trading strategies. 
 
Data Analysis 
Interpretation: strategies on singular factors 
 
From the evolution of the average monthly return obtained by each strategy some 
considerations can be made around the factors and their relation to the realized returns. I 
highlight now the most evident trend in this matter. A graph in this sense would be clearer 
and more efficient than words, in figure 1 all the individual strategies’ average monthly 
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At first not many factors had a stable pattern over time, one of the causes could be the impact 
of the crisis and its effects that were able to change the entire trend showed until that moment. 
Out of twenty-three factors eleven had a positive average monthly return, in line with the past 
evidence, for at least 90% of the months. From this group of twenty-three factors profitability 
factors, ROA and ROE, DPS, both momentum factors, volatility and earnings-per-share are 
included. 
 
One of the most recent anomalies, asset growth, did not confirm any negative relation with 
the stock return, having the strategy going long on low asset growth companies two-thirds of 
the times a negative average return. Another variable EBITDA/Sales that, in theory, should be 
similar to a profitability indicator, highlighting how good a firm is doing in managing the 
operative costs, produced a very poor performance in the sample analyzed. Most of the factors 
related to the fairness in pricing exhibited a negative trend, meaning that from mid 2006 they 
were producing good performance but from that had a constant decline, with the inception of 
the crisis culminated in negative results. Linking to this, again the crisis had a disrupting 
effect for most of the strategies, for some changing the trend from positive to negative, for 
some other representing the main source of gain. 
 
It is hard to find a general explanation for these changes in the performances when looking at 
factors individually, but when aggregating them into groups some useful considerations can 
be made. Out of the group of strategies that lost a lot, D/E, MK and P/B changed drastically 
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switched to bigger and more equity financed companies. Also P/B highlights the new 
preference of investors for firms that are highly recognized and successful, reflecting this 
success with an higher valuation of their equity compared to its book value; discarding, on the 
other hand, those firms that have a cheaper valuation of their title. In general it is possible to 
affirm that the aptitude towards risk busted, with most of the investors searching for stable 
and solid companies, able to save their money even in a period of financial turmoil. Related to 
this, the positive peak reached by the volatility strategies can be explained. Companies that 
had the lowest volatility were awarded for this stability in a period of great uncertainty. A 
similar conclusion can be inferred from the momentum strategies, in particular for companies 
that performed poorly before the crisis, the beginning of the downturn represented a major 
issue than for the others.  
 
Impact of the financial crisis 
 
This section investigates the role of the 2008 financial crisis as a game changer for most of 
the individual trading strategies. Considering the peak of the downturn of the financial 
markets as a metric, table 5 displays the returns of the individual trading strategies over the 
beginning of the crisis. As clear from the table the highest values are positive and then it is 
important to further study the determinants of this result also to understand if they represented 
the main source of gain for the overall period. 
 
Table 5: monthly returns from July 2008 to February 2009. 
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Panel B: monthly returns for momentum and volatility strategies, division between return produced by long 




The strategies that mostly gained out of this financial turmoil were the ones related to 
momentum and volatility. From table 5, panel B, it can be seen how the gain is coming from 
the short position. 
 
This result is a bit contradicting the evidence since momentum historically performed bad in 
the US, having suffered a lot from the downturn. As a matter of comparison I analyze the 
WML factors for Europe and US together with the factor I built, CR 20-260. In this case I use 
a broader period to include also the final part of the recession. 
 
Table 6: return during the crisis (June 2008 to June 2009) for momentum US, EU and the two cumulative return 
factors that I included in the analysis. The momentum factors for US and EU are retrieved from Kenneth French 
Data Library. US from Momentum consists of the returns of the average past winners from the big companies 
and the small companies minus the returns of the average past losers from the small companies. The previous 





Table 6 depicts a different scenario, with momentum factors in the Eurozone also producing a 
negative return. Curiously the momentum factor that I am using outperforms the ones 
retrieved from Kenneth French Database, the sources of the difference might be the different 
sample used (my sample should be smaller since considering just a part of the Eurozone) and 
maybe also the discard of the first twenty trading days in order to avoid mean reversal in the 
short term. In conclusion from table 6 it can actually be affirmed that the effects of the 
financial crisis were not so negative in Europe as in the US. 
 
With a broader view the impact of the crisis is also analyzed with respect to the portfolio’s 
returns. The recession period is the one identified by the Euro Area Business Cycle Dating 
Committee and goes form the first quarter of 2008 until the end of the second quarter of 2009. 
Concluding this section, table 7 displays the performance of the portfolio when either 
including or when excluding the crisis. The recession period represented a negative period 
overall for the portfolio, having a lower average return and higher volatility when including 
the crisis. Despite this, there is no capital loss having the cumulative return for the same 
period equal to 6,47%.  
 
Table 7: summary statistics for portfolio on combination of factors, excluding and including the crisis (January 




Interpretation: strategies with multitude of factors 
 
For the combination of factors it makes sense to look at the different weights given to each 
factor to see the composition of the final portfolio. For the sake of simplicity I will look at the 
first ten factors; this because these ten factors will be the ones receiving the highest weights 
for the final rank composition used to sort stocks and so they provide a valid representation 
on how the final weight is formed. 
 
Overall, for most of the time factors changed positions frequently and without maintaining it 
for a considerable amount of months; here position means the specific weight that each factor 
will have for the computation of the ranks to sort stocks.  Despite this high degree of change 
if just looking at the top factors (first four-five) two tendencies can be defined across the 
years. Until the inception of the crisis the dominating factors were the ones related to the 
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fairness in price: P/B, P/E, P/S, P/C for the first years were the factors having the highest 
weights in the portfolio. After the crisis the profitability factors, ROA and ROE, together with 
momentum (especially the 130-260 past cumulative return) got the highest ranks, together 
with these two a lot of factors changed positions. 
 
These factors were used as initially assumed because their Sharpe ratio was positive, it is 
nevertheless interesting to mention those factors that had a negative Sharpe and then they 
were used with an inverted order. In general the factors having a positive Sharpe ratio from 
the beginning were the ones with the highest weights; even so, the exceptions exist and in 
three cases they were relevant.  Debt over equity reflecting the good performance of investing 
in companies highly leveraged got one of the highest weights in the pre-crisis period, after 
that, since it was one of the factor most affected by the crisis, still got a relevant weight but 
assigning the long position to less leveraged companies. Cash ratio represents the second 
relevant exception and in this case it is clear how the usage of the variable was misused until 
the beginning. Because of its highly negative Sharpe ratio, the long position was assigned to 
companies having low cash ratio rather than a high one. The abruption of the crisis changed 
the trend for this variable, making the weight assigned to it constantly declining until the end 
of 2012, from which the variable was used also in the opposite way. The least important 
exception is represented by P/B, because this variable was used as initially assumed until the 
end of 2009. Afterwards the usage of P/B was directed to invest in companies having a high 
price to book value but this usage did not get a great consideration in terms of weight on the 
factor. 
 
Figure 3: weights assigned to factors, from April 2006 to May 2014. 
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Dissecting the portfolio returns: decile and quartile divisions 
 
A valid perspective to analyze the discriminant of the final portfolio returns is to look at the 
performances produced by companies positioned into different percentiles according to the 
different ranks. More analytically the returns displayed in table 8 are the ones referring to 
long positions taken into companies placed in that specific percentile; the division is made 
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Table 8: returns produced by different deciles and quartiles, only long position analyzed. Panel A refers to 




The deciles are more volatile than usual because the decile composition is usually made by 
fifteen companies and thus very exposed to big drawdowns. Despite this, the usual clear 
upward trend of the average monthly return is showed, moving from the lowest to the top 
decile. Since deciles can be a noisier proxy for the division of the sample I also display in 
table 8 the quartiles. This figure confirms, in a clearer way, the trend already stated before. 
 
Looking at the standard deviations the result partially confirms what Haugen and Baker 
(1996) stated about companies in their top deciles: they exhibit a lower volatility, and that 
induces them to affirm that they are GARP (Growth At a Reasonable Price) stocks. Not 
developing further this observation the result is indeed curious. Nonetheless keeping in mind 
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that the huge standard deviation for companies in lowest decile/quartile may be due to some 
outliers (companies in financial distress). 
 
The impact of the crisis is once again remarked because of its tremendous impact, investing in 
equity if considering those six months is basically a loss every time. The exclusion of those 
six months is then motivated by the fact that this scenario is not generally the case and once 
again the impact is so big because of the shortness of the sample. Moreover also to 
demonstrate how the portfolio returns are not coming solely from the short position but also 
from having selected companies that had a positive average return. 
 
Analysis of the performance: correlation with main indexes 
 
One important feature for an equity portfolio is the correlation with the stock indexes of the 
markets in which it is exposed to; this gives an idea of how much the portfolio is vulnerable 
to cyclical variations that impact the same stock markets. The comparison is made using all 
the five stock indexes of the countries analyzed, plus an equal-weight combination of the 
same five, for the returns it is used the total return index, simulating a buy-and-hold strategy 
for the whole period. 
 
Despite the fact that all the companies are gathered from these five indexes it should be 
recalled that over the selected time-period the index compositions are rebalanced twice a year, 
for most of them. Contrary to this, the companies I use are rebalanced just twice over the 
whole sample, so this inevitably gives rise to some differences concerning the companies that 
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Correlations with individual strategies and portfolio returns confirm the previous analysis 
over the weights given to the factors, denoting immediately which factors are mostly used to 
compose the final ranks used to sort stocks. From table 9 it is also evident how the 
correlations are, most of the time, either really positive or negative; this might suggests the 
fact that the portfolio is made mostly by factors that are positively correlated with each other 
and negatively correlated with the ones that are discarded. This result is highlighting the main 
drawback of the portfolio, ignoring correlation between factors leads to a lower 
diversification and thus higher risk. I remark here the surprising fact that the portfolio appears 
to be tilted over big and highly valued (high P/B) stocks, having a negative correlation with 
strategies that are short on these stocks. 
 
As immediately seen from the table, all the correlations estimated with the stock indexes are 
negative, the intuition is that the portfolio is acting mainly in a countercyclical way. This 
result can be studied further to understand what the determinants of this behavior are. The 
starting point could be the correlation between the individual strategies and the same indexes, 















From table 10 it is clear how the majority of the factors were actually positively correlated 
with the indexes; then the negative correlation of the portfolio should be explained entirely by 
the weights given to each factor. In fact remembering the portfolio composition from the 
inception of the crisis (so for most of the period studied) the ranks were basically made by 
those factors having negative correlation (those are, foremost, ROA, ROE, momentum and 
volatility). So it is probably also true that before the crisis the portfolio was positively 
correlated with the indexes since it is dominated by factors that are displaying this relation 
(mainly P/B, PE, PC). 
 
It is interesting to notice how the set of factors used for the portfolio’s weights are positively 
correlated with each other denoting the aspect of the cyclicality and different usage of factors. 
Then it seems that using this set of factors somehow recognizes the cyclicality implicit in the 
stock market and picks the best combination given the state of the economy. Unfortunately 
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the period analyzed is too short to analyze further any changes in the portfolio weights and 
observe these switches from different set of factors. 
 
Analysis of the performance: geographical composition 
 
Since investing in stocks of different countries, another analysis would be related to the 
geographical composition of the portfolio. This relates to the previous analysis of the 
correlation with the stock indexes aimed at understanding to which markets the portfolio is 
more exposed. The fact that makes this useful is that, despite the high integration in the 
Eurozone, the different stock indexes had different performances in the sample (as testified in 
table 2). 
 
The object of the analysis is the weight given to each security, the weights are then 
aggregated by country and inside each country there is a division between weights referred to 
the long position of the portfolio and the short position. This division actually helps to 
understand how companies of a country are mostly used. 
 
Overall the weight given to each country is stable, without big changes over time and the 
magnitude reflecting the different number of companies included in each stock index (so 
bigger index leads to bigger weight). Very different indeed are the weights if long and short 
positions are divided. Actually from this it is clear how the portfolio allocates “wisely” to the 
funds, having the companies of the countries that performed poorly mainly used for the short 
part and companies from countries that performed good on the long part. This allocation also 
gets important in absolute terms, having for example two countries that alone represented the 
core long and short part of strategy: Italy is, by far, the country out of which companies are 
included in the short part, for a relevant part of the period even above 40% of the overall 













Figure 4: Average division of long/short weight assigned for each country from April 2006 to May 2014, this 
weight is the sum of the weights given to securities of the same country.  
 
 
Correction for common risk factors: employing the four-factor model 
 
The last step to evaluate the performances of the portfolio somehow restarts from the analysis 
of its composition but now to see to what extent the portfolio is exposed to common risk 
factors, in other words to which risk the portfolio is exposed and in which terms. 
 
This procedure is also aimed at the identification of possible abnormal returns, this figure has 
a particular importance for at least two reasons. First it represents an award obtained by the 
portfolio without “paying” the price of higher risk. Secondly it is contradicting either the asset 
pricing model in use or the efficient market hypothesis, given the fact that using past 
information an abnormal return is generated. 
 
The correction for common risk factors is achieved using the following regression equation: 
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Table 11: results of the regression, t-stats are showed for each variable. * = significant at the 10% level, **= 




The relevant result is that the abnormal return is present and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. From the economic aspect its magnitude is also really important, given the fact that the 
alpha is expressed monthly and then annualized it means that its level is 7,41%. 
 
Moving to the analysis of the coefficients, the market beta is basically insignificant from the 
statistical and the economic aspects; this may be related to the fact that the explanatory power 
of this coefficient is captured by the SMB and HML ones, as already noted by Fama and 
French when they proposed their three-factor-model. HML and SMB are, on the other hand, 
highly significant from both perspectives. Both factors performed quite poorly from the 
beginning of the crisis, and it has been already stated how the portfolio changed composition 
from value and small stocks to bigger and highly valued stocks; since this time represents the 
major part of the period analyzed, it is explained in these terms the negative sign on both 
coefficients. WML was the only coefficient to be positive and highly significant, this result is 
not surprising since it has already been noticed how the portfolio was tilted towards 
profitability factors, which have a high correlation with momentum factors. Despite this the 
magnitude of this coefficient is still small enough to affirm that this risk factor only partially 
explains the returns obtained by the portfolio. 
 
It is nevertheless unexpected how the portfolio outperformed the indexes and obtained high 
Sharpe ratios without having a particular exposure to well-known risk factors. The striking 
conclusion from table 11 is that the four-factor model only partially explains the returns of the 
portfolio and what is the underlying risk factor that is implicitly taking. Even if not really 
considered a relevant figure the R2 lies on a lower level than most of the tests of the four-
factor model (see for instance the level reported by Fama and French (2012) in their tests 
using global factors of the four-factor model). This indicates that the part of returns not 






Portfolio turnover provides a useful picture to determine the transaction costs that the 
portfolio may face. These costs are generated by the changes in weights given to each 









The numerator accounts for the returns produced by the security between the two rebalances 
and compares it with the general return produced by the portfolio, which is scaled to allow 
long and short position to grow equally. The denominator then adjusts for the size of the 
portfolio. 
 
The resulted (annualized) average turnover for an investor who is long and short one euro in 
the portfolio is 2,27, which combined with an average half-spread of 25 basis points (Chordia 
et al. (2011)) leads to an average yearly transaction cost of 56 basis points. More specifically 
using the estimated monthly transaction costs the overall return seized by transactions is equal 
to 4,56%. This result proves the attractiveness of the portfolio, having its performance intact 
after adjusting for transaction costs. 
 
Robustness tests  
Other portfolio formation 
 
The performance of the portfolio created should be tested in a more direct comparison using 
the same dataset but different approaches. A first series of robustness tests involves the usage 
of portfolios that are formed using different set factors; this exercise will try to spot if the 
performance is mostly driven by those factors that are displaying the greatest Sharpe ratios, 
even though these factors are already receiving the highest weights eliminating totally the 
other will imply weights even higher for them. 
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As a consequence the formula that assigns weights to different factors will be changed. The 
variable modified will be the number of factors to include into the portfolio: 





There is also a division between two different perspectives: the one adopted so far that uses 
all factors disregarding the previous evidence and a different one that indeed considers just 
those factors that displayed a positive Sharpe ratio following the past evidence. For both 
methods ulterior restrictions forming are the followed portfolios just on the factors that had 
the highest one, three, five and ten Sharpe ratios. 
 
Having an approach that considers just those factors that obtained a positive Sharpe ratio 
following past evidence has the only rationale of not contradicting this same evidence. Short 
selling the individual strategies is not permitted even if they displayed a negative Sharpe ratio, 
they will simply be discarded from the weights calculation. It can be affirmed that the weight 
given to each factor is given according to the past Sharpe ratio obtained, conditional on the 
fact that this performance was achieved sorting stocks in a way that was previously 
documented by research.  
 




Portfolios not using all the positive factors are inserted to investigate whether the performance 
improves including more factors or not. Ex-ante the most viable way for an investor would be 
to use all factors, since they are also weighted according to the criteria used. 
 
The initial belief that the superior information obtained using multiple factors lead to a better 
performance was actually true for the period considered: moving from the Sharpe ratio of the 
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portfolio formed on one factor to the ones using all positive and all factors it is clear how the 
figure is trending up.  This result is actually a good sign also from the fact that using more 
factors grants more protection to the swings that affect every factor. 
 
If using more factors yielded better results inside each approach (all positive Sharpe and all 
factors) the idea of using the factors in a different way than the one initially assumed did not. 
Still, the difference is so marginal that it impairs from saying that one approach is clearly 
better than the other. It does not surprise that the performances of these two portfolios are 
very similar, as already noticed previously the factors that had a negative Sharpe ratio 
generally did not get a relevant weight. 
 
Focusing on the transaction costs the difference is not in the amount of companies selected for 
investment purpose, having all portfolios the same sample, but on the volatility of weight 
given to each security. This weight might be more stable if more factors are included in the 
analysis, such that it is more likely that the weight will remain the same for consecutive 
months. 
 
Despite the relevant difference in the ranks assigned to each factor the returns produced by 
the portfolios are all highly correlated (the minimum value is 0,8 and it is obtained with 
portfolios formed on one factor); one explanation could be the weighting formula for the 
securities, because of using all the spanning dataset the difference from the weight given to 
one rank and the higher/lower one is very small. 
Enhancing the differences: top/worst decile approach 
 
A final robustness test includes a different methodology to invest in stocks, instead of assign a 
weight to all the securities just the extremes of the sample are considered to form the long and 
the short position. This method involves the usage of deciles, even if previously criticized due 
to the discretion surrounding the approach this effect is limited simply following the main 
literature and focusing only on the top/worst decile for each strategy. 
 
The securities are ranked as before, the difference is now that the companies used for 
investment purpose are just the ones in the top decile (for the long position) and in the worst 
one (for the short position). Inside the long and short position equal weights are given to the 
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companies, such that in the end the long position is still scaled to 1 and the short position to -
1. 
 
Table 13: summary statistics portfolios formed using the decile approach, from May 2006 to May 2014. As a 




The returns produced by the decile approach are sensibly higher than the standard one; as a 
counterbalance there is also a big increase in the standard deviation; but it is not the higher 
standard deviation that makes this approach riskier in conceptual terms. It is more the fact that 
the difference between the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio with all positive factors and the one 
with all factors is definitely higher than the same difference produced by the same portfolios 
using the standard approach. This higher difference induces the consideration that the decile 
approach is less stable to changes in the assumptions regarding the usage of the factors, 
leading to very different results and not assuring that stability that investors would seek. 
This stability is indeed offered by the standard approach (recalling the results of table 12) 
with differences in the Sharpe ratios not incredibly high. 
Abnormal returns for all the portfolios 
 
Finally as a matter of completeness the four-factor model is applied to all the new portfolios 












Table 14: results of the regression for all portfolios, t-stats are showed for each variable. * = significant at the 




The most salient result is that the portfolios using the standard approach generally produced a 
positive alpha and in five out of ten cases this alpha is at least significant at the 10% level; the 
magnitude of the alpha is always around 0,5-0,7% which is quite an important result given the 
fact that this figure is expressed as monthly. 
 
The analysis of the coefficients for portfolios different from the one using all factors simply 
confirms what was affirmed before. Moving from portfolios formed on a limited number of 
factors to the ones employing more is clear how the economic and statistical significance of 
the coefficients increases; this fact might be due to the fact that the factors used to rank the 
securities are more stable. 
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The two portfolios formed using the decile approach were the ones having the highest alphas; 
the common risk-factor correction highlights some differences with the other portfolios. 
These two portfolios have higher negative loads on MKT, SML and HML, with MKT 
statistically significant for the first time. WML is strangely different when comparing the two 
portfolios formed with the decile approach, having one not statistically significant and the 




The aim of the thesis was to provide a useful method and proof on how market anomalies can 
be used in practice. The results are particularly interesting for actual investors because of the 
practical implications of this thesis. 
 
The preliminary contributions link the persistency of market anomalies over the Eurozone, the 
first part of the present work documents how simple trading strategies on these variables 
taken individually are able to produce abnormal returns; replicating the results of the paper 
that firstly documented the existence of these market anomalies. Specifically, out of the 
twenty-six variables analyzed just thirteen had a positive abnormal return and eight of them 
statistically significant; as already noticed the failure of some trading strategies to produce an 
abnormal return can be partially explained with the distressed period analyzed. In addition 
variables like size or P/B are likely to be cyclical and then, once again, the distressed period 
undermined their predictive power; this conclusion is somehow similar to the one reached by 
Liew and Vassalou (2000) related to the fact that size and value factors might be a proxy for 
future macroeconomic risk. 
 
Despite the relevance of the alpha, as a figure for indicating the attractiveness of a security, its 
magnitude is intrinsically linked to the model used to assess it. This basically gives rise to a 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the real effect of this alpha, meaning to what extent its 
magnitude can be really linked to an abnormal return not rewarded by risk and to what indeed 
it is linked to some hidden risk factor that is not included in the asset pricing model used. 
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Moving further, having observed the results of trading strategies on singular factors the issue 
of their practical implementation comes into play. This issue rotates around two basic 
questions: is it possible to predict and seize that performance with the information available at 
the beginning of the strategy? And further, what should be the discriminant that allows an 
appropriate aggregation of anomaly variables into a composite trading strategy? 
 
When a market anomaly is discovered an implicit assumption is that an investor could have 
taken advantage of it, but this assumption has a major caveat. This is because the performance 
is observed ex-post but it is rarely likely to be exploited ex-ante, at the inception of the 
investing period. The fact is that all the variables are regarded in the same way, as market 
anomalies they were all proven to be meaningful in explaining the cross-section of stock 
returns, and so the rationale around the usage of a variable instead of another is the same. The 
existence of several market anomalies then makes it difficult for an investor to choose which 
one to use. It is this problem that I tried to deal with, aggregating the factors with a precise 
rationale, trying to capture the variables that had the highest predictive power over the cross-
section of stock returns, inferring the predictive power using the Sharpe ratio. This approach 
can be seen as a more practical version of cross-sectional regression, instead of analyzing the 
predictive power of a variable over subsequent stock returns it is inferred with the past 
performance of the trading strategy using the same variable. 
 
In the core part of the thesis I proceed to the aggregation of the variables into a portfolio, the 
variables were used to produce ranks to sort stocks afterwards. The tool used to assess the 
weight to give to each variable was the Sharpe ratio produced by trading strategies on 
individual factor. As previously mentioned the Sharpe ratio was considered the best figure 
that represents the risk-return profile of each security and its maximization is the goal of 
every investor. To assume the investor’s perspective the absolute Sharpe ratio is considered, 
meaning that the usage of a certain variable (high rank to high value or opposite) was 
suggested by the Sharpe ratio: if the Sharpe was negative then the variable will be still 
considered but it will be used in an opposite way to the one used to generate the negative 
Sharpe ratio. 
 
The goodness of this method can be entirely assessed from the analysis of the portfolio 
performance. Firstly the portfolio obtained a performance that is way above the average of the 
individual strategies, affirming the possibility to get a risk-return profile that dominates most 
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of the anomalies and gets closer to the ones having the best Sharpe ratios. In other words it is 
better to use the Sharpe ratio’s forecasting power than randomly select a strategy out the 
basket made by twenty-six anomalies. 
 
The outstanding performance of the portfolio can be hardly explained, the asset pricing model 
used only partially captured the risk components of the portfolio, leaving then unsolved the 
nature of the returns obtained. It cannot be affirmed if these returns are a product of 
mispricings in the market or either a higher risk. 
 
Not surprisingly I documented in my robustness tests how a portfolio that is formed just using 
the factor that had the highest Sharpe ratio fails to resemble the performance of the trading 
strategies that outperformed all the others. This point remarks again the fact that the 
observation of the performance does not imply that an investor could have seized that at the 
inception of the period. 
 
Finally using all factors allows the portfolio to have a greater diversification, this 
diversification proves to be really relevant in affecting the dynamicity of the portfolio. This 
practically translates in a portfolio capable of detecting the state of the economy and the 
geographical diversities around the stocks of the sample. The success of this diversification 
has to be found in the very high heterogeneity around the different anomaly variables (as 
proven by table 12, highlighting the correlation between trading strategies on individual 
factors and the stock indexes).  
 
Usually when using market anomalies into trading strategies it was suggested to divide the 
companies into deciles (according to the different ranks given using the anomaly variable) 
and then to make usage of the top decile for the long position and the worst one for the short 
position. This approach excludes then most of the companies, preferring to focus only on the 
extremes. Furthermore, apart from following this rule of thumb of investing in the top/worst 
decile there is no other motivation for discarding most of the companies, meaning that no rule 
indicates which decile is better following a precise methodology. 
 
Developing new trading rules Cooper, Gulen and Vassalou (2002) provide a guideline for 
further research, in their paper they implement a method that allow the portfolio decile 
composition to change over time, this is achieved imposing filters on the expected return of 
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the stocks, if the return is higher/lower than a certain threshold then the stock will be 
automatically included into the portfolio. Even if this paper shed light on new applications for 
trading strategies it is more concerned on eliminating a usual problem when dealing with 
deciles, which is the risk that companies that are forming the short position have a positive 
expected return, that is why the filter is established to be zero or negative.  
 
In the present work I used a simple formula to use all the securities available for investment 
purpose; the weight placed on each security is proportional to the rank that it receives. A 
similar intuition is then applied when it came to aggregate the factors using their Sharpe ratio: 
the weight placed on the factor for the final rank was proportional to its Sharpe ratio. Further 
variants should be studied as long as different metrics to aggregate the factors. In particular it 
should be studied a new metric to couple with the Sharpe ratio in order to account for 
correlation among variables and then optimally diversify across factors. 
 
Moving to the limitations I will highlight the major drawbacks of the present study. First of 
all, concerning the magnitude of the alpha, Fama and French (2013) have already developed a 
five-factor model that improves the explanatory power over the cross-section of stock returns, 
this increase in the explanatory power is mainly due to the addiction of a profitability factor. 
As already noted the main factors used to give ranks to securities, from the crisis onwards, are 
related to profitability variables, like ROA or ROE and then it makes easy to affirm that 
testing the portfolio returns on such model the out coming alpha should be smaller than the 
one reported. 
 
Another limitation is linked to the performance of the portfolio, as clear from the cumulative 
returns of the portfolio in the most recent years the returns were negative. There are several 
different hypotheses on the explanation of this. It could be that the portfolio does not perform 
well in a period of reassessment of the economy, in between a recession and the subsequent 
recovery. This might be because of the change in weights happening in a gradual way and so 
it may be that the portfolio still considers anti-cyclical variables in a relevant way even if they 
are already losing their predictive power over the future cross-section of stock returns. A 
possible solution would be to use a smaller window than the cumulative Sharpe ratio, but this 
will probably give rise to instability problems in distressed period, considering this last issue 
as more dangerous I preferred to focus just on cumulative Sharpe ratios. Having for example 
a moving Sharpe ratio would probably allow the portfolio to be more dynamic, not having in 
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fact a declining marginal effect of the last month performance, but similarly it will make it 
more volatile to changes in the stock market (and consequently more costly due to higher 
turnover). Another possible explanation could be the crowding out effect, investors might 
have realized that using the Sharpe ratio as a tool to aggregate variables produce a good 
performance and so the extensive usage of this strategy deployed its profitability. Even 
though it might be possible this option seems implausible, since this thesis does not claim to 
have discovered a new methodology to use market anomalies, mostly for its simplicity, it 
seems that is more reasonable to assume that investors were already aware of the goodness of 
this method and simply invested more into it in the latest years. 
 
In conclusion I have provided evidence over the usage of market anomalies in the Eurozone, 
with their successful employment into a composite trading strategy. The obtained risk-return 
profile is above the stock market indexes used as benchmark and most of the trading 
strategies on singular anomalies. The portfolio nonetheless proven to be able to spot 
cyclicality in the economy due to the heterogeneity of the factors used; given the distressed 
period I analyzed a negative correlation of the portfolio with the main stock indexes. 
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Appendix 
List of variables 
 
All variables used, Bloomberg ticker is expressed if the variable is retrieved from Bloomberg: 
 
Name Shortcut Bloomberg ticker 
Return on asset ROA RETURN_ON_ASSET 
Asset growth AG ASSET_GROWTH 
Sales growth SG SALES_GROWTH 
Price to cash PC PX_TO_CASH_FLOW 
Price to book PB PX_TO_BOOK_RATIO 
Price to earnings PE PE_RATIO 
Debt to equity DE TOT_DEBT_TO_COM_EQY 
Return on equity ROE RETURN_COM_EQY 
Market capitalization MK CUR_MKT_CAP 
EBITDA to revenues EBITDA EBITDA_TO_REVENUE 
Dividend per share DPS EQY_DPS 
Enterprise value to sales EV EV_TO_T12M_SALES 
Cash ratio CR CASH_RATIO 
Price to sales PS PX_TO_SALES_RATIO 
Trail 12-months EPS EPS TRAIL_12M_EPS 
Cash growth CG CASH_FLOW_GROWTH 
CAPEX growth CAPEX TOT_CAP_EXPEND_GROWTH 
Trading volume VOL PX_VOLUME 
Annualized EPS EPS ANN EPS_ANNUALIZED 
Moving average 20-260 MA 20-260 - 
Moving average 130-260 MA 130-260 - 
Cumulative return 20-260 CR 20-260 - 
Cumulative return 130-260 CR 130-260 - 
Standard deviation 20-260 STD 20-260 - 
Standard deviation 130-260 STD 130-260 - 
Beta BETA 260 - 
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List of companies 
	  
The ticker is as indicated and used in the Bloomberg Terminal. Highlighted in red the 
companies that were discarded.	  
	  
	  
2004 Indexes composition 
Ticker # Ticker # Ticker # 
AGL IM Equity 1 IFX GY Equity 58 ACS SM Equity 114 
AL IM Equity 2 LHA GY Equity 59 ACX SM Equity 115 
ATL IM Equity 3 LIN GY Equity 60 ALT SM Equity 116 
BEN IM Equity 4 MAN GY Equity 61 ANA SM Equity 117 
BFI IM Equity 5 MEO GY Equity 62 BBVA SM Equity 118 
BMPS IM 
Equity 6 MUV2 GY Equity 63 BKT SM Equity 119 
BNL IM Equity 7 RWE GY Equity 64 ELE SM Equity 120 
BPVN IM 
Equity 8 SAP GY Equity 65 ENG SM Equity 121 
BUL IM Equity 9 SCH GY Equity 66 FCC SM Equity 122 
CAP IM Equity 10 SIE GY Equity 67 GAM SM Equity 123 
CPR IM Equity 11 TKA GY Equity 68 GAS SM Equity 124 
EDN IM Equity 12 TUI1 GY Equity 69 IBE SM Equity 125 
ENEL IM Equity 13 VOW GY Equity 70 IBLA SM Equity 126 
ENI IM Equity 14 AC FP Equity 71 IDR SM Equity 127 
ES IM Equity 15 ACA FP Equity 72 ITX SM Equity 128 
F IM Equity 16 AGF FP Equity 73 LOR SM Equity 129 
FNC IM Equity 17 AI FP Equity 74 MAP SM Equity 130 
FWB IM Equity 18 AIR FP Equity 75 MVC SM Equity 131 
G IM Equity 19 ALU FP Equity 76 NHH SM Equity 132 
ISP IM Equity 20 AVE FP Equity 77 POP SM Equity 133 
IT IM Equity 21 BN FP Equity 78 REE SM Equity 134 
LUX IM Equity 22 BNP FP Equity 79 REP SM Equity 135 
MB IM Equity 23 CA FP Equity 80 SAN SM Equity 136 
MED IM Equity 24 CAP FP Equity 81 SCYR SM Equity 137 
MN IM Equity 25 CO FP Equity 82 SGC SM Equity 138 
MS IM Equity 26 CS FP Equity 83 TEF SM Equity 139 
NTV IM Equity 27 DG FP Equity 84 TEM SM Equity 140 
PC IM Equity 28 DX FP Equity 85 TPI SM Equity 141 
PG IM Equity 29 EN FP Equity 86 TRR SM Equity 142 
PMI IM Equity 30 FP FP Equity 87 UNF SM Equity 143 
R IM Equity 31 GLE FP Equity 88 ZEL SM Equity 144 
RCS IM Equity 32 HO FP Equity 89 
3577044Z NA 
Equity 145 
SPI IM Equity 33 KER FP Equity 90 AGN NA Equity 146 
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SRG IM Equity 34 LG FP Equity 91 AH NA Equity 147 
STM IM Equity 35 LOR FP Equity 92 AKZA NA Equity 148 
TIM IM Equity 36 MC FP Equity 93 ASML NA Equity 149 
TIS IM Equity 37 ML FP Equity 94 CXP NA Equity 150 
TIT IM Equity 38 MMB FP Equity 95 DSM NA Equity 151 
UBI IM Equity 39 OR FP Equity 96 FORA NA Equity 152 
UCG IM Equity 40 ORA FP Equity 97 GTN NA Equity 153 
ADS GY Equity 41 RI FP Equity 98 GUC NA Equity 154 
ALT GY Equity 42 RNO FP Equity 99 HEIA NA Equity 155 
ALV GY Equity 43 SAN FP Equity 100 HGM NA Equity 156 
BAS GY Equity 44 SGO FP Equity 101 INGA NA Equity 157 
BAYN GY 
Equity 45 STM FP Equity 102 KPN NA Equity 158 
BMW GY 
Equity 46 SU FP Equity 103 LOG NA Equity 159 
CBK GY Equity 47 SW FP Equity 104 MOO NA Equity 160 
CON GY Equity 48 SZE FP Equity 105 NUM NA Equity 161 
DAI GY Equity 49 TCHNR FP Equity 106 PHIA NA Equity 162 
DB1 GY Equity 50 TFI FP Equity 107 PNL NA Equity 163 
DBK GY Equity 51 UG FP Equity 108 RDA NA Equity 164 
DPW GY Equity 52 VIE FP Equity 109 REN NA Equity 165 




Equity 111 UNA NA Equity 167 
FME GY Equity 55 
3593258Q SM 
Equity 112 VNUA NA Equity 168 
HEN3 GY 
Equity 56 ABE SM Equity 113 WKL NA Equity 169 
HVM GY Equity 57 
    	  
2009 Indexes composition 
Ticker # Ticker # Ticker # 
A2A IM Equity 1 LHA GY Equity 58 ACS SM Equity 114 
AGL IM Equity 2 LIN GY Equity 59 ACX SM Equity 115 
AL IM Equity 3 MAN GY Equity 60 ANA SM Equity 116 
ATL IM Equity 4 MEO GY Equity 61 BBVA SM Equity 117 
BMPS IM 
Equity 5 MRK GY Equity 62 BKT SM Equity 118 
BP IM Equity 6 MUV2 GY Equity 63 BME SM Equity 119 
BUL IM Equity 7 RWE GY Equity 64 BTO SM Equity 120 
BZU IM Equity 8 SAP GY Equity 65 CABK SM Equity 121 
ENEL IM Equity 9 SDF GY Equity 66 ENG SM Equity 122 
ENI IM Equity 10 SIE GY Equity 67 FCC SM Equity 123 
ES IM Equity 11 SZG GY Equity 68 FER SM Equity 124 
F IM Equity 12 TKA GY Equity 69 GAM SM Equity 125 
FNC IM Equity 13 VOW GY Equity 70 GAS SM Equity 126 
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FWB IM Equity 14 AC FP Equity 71 GRF SM Equity 127 
G IM Equity 15 ACA FP Equity 72 IBE SM Equity 128 
GEO IM Equity 16 AF FP Equity 73 IBLA SM Equity 129 
GTK IM Equity 17 AI FP Equity 74 IBR SM Equity 130 
ISP IM Equity 18 AIR FP Equity 75 IDR SM Equity 131 
IT IM Equity 19 ALO FP Equity 76 ITX SM Equity 132 
LUX IM Equity 20 ALU FP Equity 77 MAP SM Equity 133 
MB IM Equity 21 BN FP Equity 78 OHL SM Equity 134 
MED IM Equity 22 BNP FP Equity 79 POP SM Equity 135 
MN IM Equity 23 CA FP Equity 80 REE SM Equity 136 
MS IM Equity 24 CAP FP Equity 81 REP SM Equity 137 
PC IM Equity 25 CS FP Equity 82 SAB SM Equity 138 
PG IM Equity 26 DG FP Equity 83 SAN SM Equity 139 
PLT IM Equity 27 DX FP Equity 84 SCYR SM Equity 140 
PMI IM Equity 28 EDF FP Equity 85 TEF SM Equity 141 
PRY IM Equity 29 EI FP Equity 86 TL5 SM Equity 142 
SAL IM Equity 30 EN FP Equity 87 TRE SM Equity 143 
SPM IM Equity 31 FP FP Equity 88 UNF SM Equity 144 
SRG IM Equity 32 GLE FP Equity 89 AGN NA Equity 145 
STM IM Equity 33 GSZ FP Equity 90 AH NA Equity 146 
TEN IM Equity 34 KER FP Equity 91 AKZA NA Equity 147 
TIT IM Equity 35 LG FP Equity 92 ASML NA Equity 148 
TRN IM Equity 36 MC FP Equity 93 
BAMNB NA 
Equity 149 
UBI IM Equity 37 ML FP Equity 94 CORA NA Equity 150 
UCG IM Equity 38 MMB FP Equity 95 DSM NA Equity 151 
UNI IM Equity 39 MTP FP Equity 96 FORA NA Equity 152 
US IM Equity 40 OR FP Equity 97 FUR NA Equity 153 
ADS GY Equity 41 ORA FP Equity 98 HEIA NA Equity 154 
ALV GY Equity 42 RI FP Equity 99 INGA NA Equity 155 
BAS GY Equity 43 RNO FP Equity 100 KPN NA Equity 156 
BAYN GY 
Equity 44 SAN FP Equity 101 MT NA Equity 157 
BEI GY Equity 45 SEV FP Equity 102 PHIA NA Equity 158 
BMW GY 
Equity 46 SGO FP Equity 103 PNL NA Equity 159 
CBK GY Equity 47 STM FP Equity 104 RAND NA Equity 160 
DAI GY Equity 48 SU FP Equity 105 RDSA NA Equity 161 
DB1 GY Equity 49 UG FP Equity 106 REN NA Equity 162 
DBK GY Equity 50 UL FP Equity 107 SBMO NA Equity 163 
DPB GY Equity 51 VIE FP Equity 108 TOM2 NA Equity 164 
DPW GY Equity 52 VIV FP Equity 109 UL NA Equity 165 




Equity 111 USG NA Equity 167 
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FME GY Equity 55 ABE SM Equity 112 WHA NA Equity 168 
HEN3 GY 
Equity 56 ABG SM Equity 113 WKL NA Equity 169 
IFX GY Equity 57 
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